à l'attention de frederic S : vos documents et courriers sont très interessants, ils transmettent une émotion sur l'arrivée des allemands à Grandpré. On ressent vraiment la craintes de cette famille en apprenant l'avancée des allemands dans les Ardennes.
Avez vous d'autres echanges entre les habitants du canton ? (existent ils d'autres courriers pendant la periode d'occupation)
à l'attention de Hervé : Vous évoquez la mort de Raymond Blum (armée US) à Grandpré, Savez vous comment et ou (la rue) est mort Raymond Blum ? Savez vous combien de morts y a t il eu durant cette bataille de la libération du village ?
Je trouve qu'on tient "le bon fil" on a les sensations sur l'arrivée des allemands (les ecrits de frederic), on a des photos sur l'occupation (si on avait des temoignages écrits, ce serait le top), on a la liberation (merci à l'US ARMY, j'ai demandé à mon cousin de traduire les archives de US ARMY)
Questions supplémentaires : (je suis trop curieux )
-Les habitants ont ils été évacués à l'arrivée des allemands ? On apprend dans les lettres de monsieur Brunesseaux que des ponts ont été deruits et que le train pour Grandpré n'est plus en service et qu'il faut se rendre à Chalerange.
-y a t il des habitants qui sont revenus dans cette zone alors qu'elle était occupée ? (je ne sais pas si s'etait possible)
- dans quelle region ont été évacuée les habitants de Grandpré (y avait il des lieux définits par le gouvernement pour les évacuations)
-Quelles étaient les tâches quotidiennes des habitants sous l'occupations ?
- Grande question : a quoi les combats de rues pouvaient ils ressembler ? Pendant la guerre 39 45, les armées bénéficiaient de materiels blindés pour pénétrer et reduire les nids de resistance dans les villes.
Pendant la guerre 14 18, comment la penetration se faisait (bombardement intense ???) ? On a toujours l'image d'une guerre de tranchées mais lors de la reprise de la guerre de mouvement, il y avait très peu de chars et beaucoup de canons.
Quand je vois les photos sur l'etat de la commune de Grandpré après la libération (beaucoup de ruines), cela implique qu'il y ait eu de forts combats de rues, les militaires utilisaient ils des canons en les deplaçants dans la village pour detruire ???
-A un moment dans vos differents écrits, vous évoquez l'évacuation de Grandpré avant l'arrivée de l'armée US.
Pourquoi les allemands ont eu la politesse d'évacuer la commune ?
Ou sont allés se cacher les habitants ? (dans la forêt ?)
- A la fin de la guerre, la commune est ruinée. Comment a t elle été rebatit ? Qui a payé pour la reconstruction (comment était estimé le montant de l'indemnisation des habitants), Pourquoi toutes les maisons n'ont pas été reconstruites ?
- Comme le faisait remarquer Mick55, le nombre d'habitant a fortement baissé (1911 - 1009 habitants 1921 - 640 habitants). Cette baisse est elle du à des morts durant l'occupation ou la libération ? ou sont partis ces 400 habitants ?
S'ils sont partis, ont ils été indemnisé par le gouvernement pour la perte de leur maison ?
Je sais, j'ai encore trop de questions mais ce sujet me passionne.
Je suis actuellement à Grandpré pour le week end, je vais prendre quelques photos de l'existant pour comparer avec vos photos.
EN 2011 on peut s apercevoir que les maisons de gauche ont disparues, regardez on reconnait bien la forme des portes notamment de la pharmacie (elle n'est plus à cet endroit aujourd'hui)
VUE DU MILIEU DE LA RUE DE MONTFLIX AVANT L OFFENSIVE DE 1918
Je revient sur vos questions. Ls combats de rues, je ne crois pas que l'on peut assimiler les combats qu'ont fait les soldats de la première guerre mondiale pour récupérer les village à la guérilla de rue du la seconde guerre mondiale. On est loin de Stalingrand....... Les canons ont tirés sur Grandpré comme sur d'autres villages mais on ne parle pas de tir d'une rue à l'autre on parle de tirs plutôt éloignés. Les batteries étaient plutôt positionner à quelques kilomètres de la cible et on bombardait.
Pour le fait que les allemands aient quittés le village, il se pourrait qu'ils aient fut la commune pour éviter les bombardements. Il est facile de tirer sur un village, il y a beaucoup de points de repère.
Comment le village à été reconstruit, d'abord avec les dommages de guerre. Il faudrait vous rendre aux A.D. des Ardennes, il doit y avoir un fichier concernant les dommages causés par les combats. Vous trouverez au moins pour les bâtiments publics (église, mairie, école, etc., ...) des évaluations des dégâts chiffrés et si vous êtes chanceux des factures de reconstruction. Ces documents existent pour certaines communes de Meuse et parfois ont à la chance de retrouver les plans d'époque des bâtiments reconstruits.
Pour la fortes diminution d'habitants après la guerre, cela vient surtout des gens qui ne sont jamais revenus dans le village. Certains après avoir tout perdus n'ont jamais voulu revenir, trop de souvenir et parfois la mémoire d'un membre de la famille tué au combat. Mais je ne pense pas que Grandpré à perdu 400 habitants suites à la guerre, ou alors vous auriez un monument aux morts beaucoup plus imposant. Pour les habitants qui ont quittés la commune après la guerre, ils ont été indemnisés pour la perte de leur bien mobilier et immobilier mais ces indemnités n'étaient pas toujours juste et on voit dans certains villages des gens toucher bien plus que ce qu'ils ont réellement perdus. Je vous l'ai dit plusieurs villages du secteur ont connus cette exode, cela s'explique par le double traumatisme dans les Ardennes de la guerre de 1870 et de celle de 1914-1918.
Pour ce qui est de l'exode, les habitants de Grandpré ont du commencer par migrer vers les départements limitrophes dont la Meuse. D'après ce que j'ai pu discuter avec des anciens de la région qui m'ont dit avoir vu (ou entendu parler par leurs parents) des gens des alentours occupés par les allemands venir chez eux.
Pour ce qui est d'avoir des habitants d'un village occupé qui retourne dans ce dernier pendant l'occupation, je pense que cela se serait approché du suicide. Imaginez vous traverser les lignes françaises puis allemandes et retourner entre les colonnes de militaires qui montent au front dans votre village, tout cela sans qu'aucuns allemands ne s'intéresse à vous..... Cela me paraît improbable et surtout complètement dingue si vous étiez dans un village non occupé même si il n'était pas le votre à l'origine.
Pour l'occupation des civils sur place, les commerces devaient tournés et les agriculteurs cultivaient, le travail continuaient même si ceux c'étaient pour les allemands. Ils ne faut pas croire que les allemands nourrissaient des civils sur leurs ressources c'était plutôt l'inverse.
Voici le texte de l'US ARMY sur La bataille d'argonne (merci Alain), je vais essayer de le faire traduire.
Meuse-Argonne Offensive
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 26�OCTOBER 5
FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [3, 5]
The American First Army was organized on August 10, and on August 30 assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. From September 11 to 16 it conducted
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the St. Mihiel Offensive which resulted in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. [5]
With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had bean agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [5, 6, 7, 107]
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan�Sedan�Mézières railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. [5]
Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. This position extended from Bois de Forêt, across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north of Grandpré. The fourth position included the heights of Barricourt, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thénorgues. The first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous intermediate positions constructed between them.
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These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain, presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans would resist here to the last extremity. [5]
The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grandpré. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay�le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mézières or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande Montagne. [5]
In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offense, the front of the First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest on September 22. The attack was to be launched at 5:30 a. m., September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army was to attack in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse were not to attack during the opening days of the offensive. [5]
P
The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service of the 92d Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.
Thc 92d Division, less the 368th Infantry and the 167th Field Artillery Brigade, was in reserve of the I Corps on September 26. The 368th Infantry was an element of the Franco-American liaison group known as Groupement Durand which operated between the American First Army and the French Fourth Army. The regiment attacked on the right of Groupement Durand on the morning
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of the 26th on a 1-battalion front from La Harazée to Vienne-le-Château. Thc regiment advanced about 1 kilometer, but in the evening all except scattered platoons and its left company withdrew. Thc left company maintained positions for the night in Tranchée des Baleines.
On the morning of September 27 the regiment, with two battalions in line, reached and held scattered positions in Tranchée de la Tringle, Tranchée Tirpitz and the upper reaches of Vallée Moreau. In another attack late in the afternoon positions were reached east and west of the Vienne-le-Château�Binarville road; in and near Tranchée Tirpitz and in Vallée Moreau.
On September 28 one company gained and occupied a line in the ravine north of Tranchée Tirpitz. Troops on the left occupied positions in Vallée Moreau.
Thc regiment took no offensive action on September 29. The left battalion was relieved by French troops. The right battalion was relieved by the former reserve battalion which took up positions in Tranchée Tirpitz.
On September 30 the regiment had moved forward to Tranchée du Dromadaire by noon, and in the late afternoon joined the French in an assault on Binarville. The town was captured and a line for the night held about 300 meters to the south. There were detachments northeast of the town and one company in line with the French.
The 368th Infantry was withdrawn from the front line on the morning of October 1. The 92d Division, less artillery, engineers, and the 183d Infantry Brigade, had been placed at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Corps on the 29th, and remained in reserve of that corps from October 1 to 4.
The plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive contemplated that the First Army would advance rapidly east of the Argonne Forest, and that the main attack of the French Fourth Army would be made west of the Aisne River. By this enveloping action, the enemy was to be forced to evacuate his strong positions in the Argonne Forest. Liaison between the two armies was to be maintained by a Franco-American group which was to
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operate between the Argonne Forest and the Aisne River. [8, 12]
The 92d Division was designated as reserve of the I Corps. It was still without its artillery brigade, but had attached to it the 62d Field Artillery Brigade, 37th Division. The engineer regiment, three battalions of infantry, two companies of the 351st Machine-Gun Battalion, and the 368th Infantry had been detached for other missions. The 368th Infantry, by arrangement with the French Fourth Army, was to form a part of the Franco-American liaison group which was to maintain contact between the 77th Division, I Corps, the left element of the First Army, and the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, French XXXVIII Corps, the right element of the French Fourth Army. [8, 9, l0, 11, 12]
This liaison group, organized as a provisional brigade, was known both as Groupement Durand and Groupement Rive Droite, and was to operate as the right element of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. It was to attack in the following formation:
Fr 11th Cuirassiers Amer 368th Infantry
2d Battalion 3d Battalion 2d Battalion
1st Battalion 3d Battalion
1st Battalion (Div Res)
The boundaries assigned for the attack were as follows:
Left boundary, American First Army: La Harazée (incl.)�Binarville (excl.)�Lançon (excl.)�Grand Ham (incl.).
Left boundary, American 77th Division (as ordered by that division): La Harazée (incl.)�road junction 800 meters northwest of Moulin de l'Homme Mort�Etang de Poligny.
Right boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand): La Harazée (excl.)�crossroads about 700 meters north of point 213�Binarville�Lançon.
Left boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand): east edge of Bois Long�Bois Carré�Boyau de la Cote 176 (incl.)�point 500 meters west of Binarville.
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The right boundary of Groupement Durand and the 368th Infantry did not coincide precisely with the left boundary of the 77th Division. A gradually widening gap existed between the two boundaries, and at Binarville was about 800 meters wide. [8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
The French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was to advance astride the Aisne River, making its main effort with those elements west of the river. Groupement Durand, operating east of the river, was to protect the right of the troops making the main effort, and maintain liaison with the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest. As the attack progressed, it was expected that the French 11th Cuirassiers would be pinched out by the convergent advances to both flanks. [12, 15, 17]
On September 24 Groupement Durand issued orders directing one battalion of the 368th Infantry to relieve the 1st Battalion, 11th Cuirassiers, during the night of September 24-25 in the Biesme subsector, from point 213 west to a point about 300 meters west of the Vienne-le-Château�Binarville road. The support and reserve battalions were to remain south of La Biesme Rivière. At 9 p. m. on the 24th the 368th Infantry commenced its forward movement, and on the following morning completed the relief. [13, 18]
On September 25 the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division announced that the assault troops of Groupement Durand would be in position on the night of September 25-26. Special efforts were to be made not to attract the attention of the enemy in gaining the line of departure, which ran northwest from point 213 to a point about 300 meters southeast of Bois Beaurain. An artillery preparation was to commence six hours before the hour of attack. The troops west of the Aisne were to keep in advance of Groupement Durand. At H-hour Groupement Durand was to advance to a line extending generally east and west through Servon and occupy the first line of hostile trenches, whereupon units were to be reorganized, reconnaissance to the front was to be made and positions were to be held against hostile counterattack, particularly from the Argonne Forest. Upon command of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Divi-
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sion, the elements west of the Aisne were to make a further thrust to the north. [19]
The mission assigned the 368th Infantry was to keep the enemy under surveillance and maintain contact, assure liaison to both flanks and, in case of enemy withdrawal, to pursue in conjunction with the 11th Cuirassiers. To accomplish the latter portion of this mission, the assault battalion was to form a line of resistance as far forward as possible, feeling out the enemy with patrols and advance as opportunity offered. Mixed liaison detachments were to be provided to both flanks. Finally, if the 368th Infantry was to be ready to send an advance guard toward Binarville. The regimental reserve battalion, from a position to be taken up north of the Biesme, was to be prepared to meet counterattacks from the northeast, but was not to be engaged in the attack of the regiment without authority of Groupement Durand. On the 25th this battalion was to make reconnaissances of the roads in the direction of Binarville, and to the northeast. The battalion in division reserve was to be engaged only upon orders of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. On September 25 it was to reconnoiter routes of advance to Vienne-le-Château and vicinity. [14, 20]
In orders issued by the 368th Infantry the 3d Battalion was directed to secure and maintain liaison with support elements of the 77th Division. The hour for the attack was announced as 5:30 a. m. September 26. [21]
Sept. 26
The 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, attacked about 5:25 a. m., supported by the regimental machine-gun company. The artillery at the disposition of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was insufficient to provide efficient preparation in the zone of action of the regiment, and did little or no damage to the heavily wired enemy positions in its front. Furthermore, no heavy wirecutters were supplied by the French division in time to be of use for the attack, and as a consequence the troops were forced to advance through the existing trenches or paths. This made lateral communication extremely difficult. [13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 ]
The action of the leading battalion soon developed into separate movements by three groups, only one of which was con-
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